Political report of the Executive of the Jewish Agency submitted to the ... Zionist Congress and the ... session of the Council of the Jewish Agency
- Journal
- Political report of the Executive of the Jewish Agency submitted to the ... Zionist Congress and the ... session of the Council of the Jewish Agency
- Volume
- 1937
- Issue
- 8.1937
- Date
- 1937-08-01
- Page
- Seite 138 (sequence 146)
- Language
- English
- Belongs to
- journal issue
- OCR quality
- 78% known words query
- IRI
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OCR text
138 Arab strike, including such matters as the disbandment of the strike committee, the arrest of the leading terrorists, and the arming of the Jews in defence of their lives and property. The question of compensation for losses was also raised, but the Government took up the attitude that the consideration of that question was premature. In May, 1936, Dr. Weizmann was granted an interview by the Prime Minister, in the course of which he discussed with nim the situation in Palestine. He pointed out that under the auspices of the British Government the Jews in Palestine i:ad increased to 400,000. Those Jews had come in in reliance on Britain's word. The responsibility for their presence and for their future, was Great Britain's. Dr. Weizmann also dealt with the wider implications of the Mandate, and with the great constructive rôle which, with the development of the National Home, the Jews might yet be destined to play in the Mediterranean. The Government Statement of Policy on Palestine : It was not until the Arab strike and the acts of murder and outrage had continued for nearly five months that on September 7th the Government issued a statement to the effect that the campaign of violence by which the Arab leaders were attempting to gain their ends could not be allowed to continue, and that more rapid and effective action must now be taken to bring the existing state of disorder to an end with the least possible delay. In pursuance of this decision, the statement went on to add, the Government considered it essential to send substantial reinforcements to Palestine, and had further decided to entrust the supreme military command in the country to Lieutenant-General J. G. Dill, late Director-General of Military Operations and Intelligence at the War Office. This announcement, the effect of which was enhanced by the fact that the immediate embarkation of a Division of troops involved the cancellation of Army Manoeuvres which were then pending, received the greatest prominence in the English press. Considerable space was devoted in all the newspapers to the departure of troops for Palestine, and to a description of previous events there, and in general the publicity given to the matter was such as might have heralded the opening of a major campaign. At about the same time reports became current of attempts on the part of rulers of the neighbouring Arab countries to intervene (in particular through the medium of the then Foreign Minister of Iraq, Nüri Pasha es Said), by attempting to obtain assurances from the Government with regard to immigration and other matters in exchange for which the strike and terrorist campaign would be called off. The strongest objection was taken by the Executive to this unwarranted interference, with its dangerous implications for the future, by the neighbouring Arab states, and in a letter to Dr. Weizmann which was made public, Mr. Ormsby-Gore denied that any