Political report of the Executive of the Jewish Agency submitted to the ... Zionist Congress and the ... session of the Council of the Jewish Agency
- Journal
- Political report of the Executive of the Jewish Agency submitted to the ... Zionist Congress and the ... session of the Council of the Jewish Agency
- Volume
- 1937
- Issue
- 8.1937
- Date
- 1937-08-01
- Page
- Seite 108 (sequence 116)
- Language
- English
- Belongs to
- journal issue
- OCR quality
- 70% known words query
- IRI
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OCR text
108 create the impression among the Arab population that the strike had the sanction of Government behind it. This impression was strengthened by the inadequate measures taken to prevent intimidation and to protect the peaceful inhabitants, anxious to continue their work, against the pressure of terrorists. The spreading of the strike throughout the country created a firm basis for the authority of the Arab Higher Committee and led to the intensification and the prolongation of the disorders. 3. Government gave virtual recognition to the Arab Higher Committee, which openly assumed the leadership of the movement of rebellion, and continued to negotiate with it. At the beginning of the disturbances the Committee was permitted to tour the country and to address demonstrations and public meetings. The speeches of the President and members of the Committee during that tour were of a seditious character. In disregard of an express warning given to the Committee by the High Commissioner, which was officially published, it issued an appeal for civil disobedience and non-payment of taxes. Despite these subversive activities no action was taken to disband the Committee and to prosecute its members. 4. The actual measures adopted by Government did not correspond to the strong declarations expressing its determination to restore order. The impression was thus fostered that those carrying on the strike and disturbances might do so with comparative impunity. Government also failed to exercise powers it had taken under the Emergency Regulations. Moreover, such steps as were resorted to, were frequently taken only after considerable and inexcusable delay. This strengthened the hands of the forces of violence and enabled them to bring large sections of the peaceful population under their sway. 5. The measures taken to obtain re-inforcements, both by bringing over troops from outside as well as by recruiting Jewish supernumerary police, were characterised by dilatoriness. In the end very large military re-inforcements became necessary to put an end to the disorders. Had a determined and concentrated attempt been made at a much earlier stage to enforce respect for law and order, it is very probable that there would eventually! have been no need for such an extraordinary effort. 6. The investigation and prosecution of crime was throughout the disturbances almost entirely in the hands of Arab officials, with the result that there was a complete failure of the machinery of crime prosecution. In consequence only an insignificant number of those who committed the more serious crimes were apprehended or brought to trial. Of the few that were tried most were acquitted because of ineffective prosecution.