Political report of the Executive of the Jewish Agency submitted to the ... Zionist Congress and the ... session of the Council of the Jewish Agency
- Journal
- Political report of the Executive of the Jewish Agency submitted to the ... Zionist Congress and the ... session of the Council of the Jewish Agency
- Volume
- 1937
- Issue
- 8.1937
- Date
- 1937-08-01
- Page
- Seite 29 (sequence 37)
- Language
- English
- Belongs to
- journal issue
- OCR quality
- 78% known words query
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29 tiations of peace with the Arabs might be initiated. Though it was extremely doubtful whether negotiations with Arab representatives would then haxe materialised under any conditions and whether, even if they had, they would have resulted in an agreement, the Executive was always ready to enter into such discussions. It emphatically refused, however, to entertain any suggestion of negotiations based on the preliminary condition of the suspension of immigration. Its attitude on this point may be gauged from the following record of a conversation which the representative of the Jewish Agency had with a prominent Arab personage in August 1936: "His main object was to convince me that the proper thing for us Jews to do was to offer a suspension of immigration of our own free will. This would be regarded by the Arabs as a proof that we were really sincere in the declarations of our desire to reach an agreement with them. "I replied that I thought that I was giving a sufficient proof of the earnestness of our desire for peace when I said that my friends and I would be prepared to sit down at once with the Arab leaders and discuss peace. It would have been quite natural for us Jews to say that we refused to sit down to negotiate with murderers.* Nevertheless, we were ready to negotiate with the Arab leaders whom we held responsible for all this bloodshed. But to ask us to suspend immigration was to ask for much more than a mere earnest of our good will towards the Arabs. What it actually amounted to was that we were expected to admit that the Arabs were the real masters of the country and that since we had irritated them by our immigration it was our duty to stop it and go and ask their permission to enter the country. We did not admit the right of the Arabs to dominate Palestine. Jews were here as of right just as much as the Arabs were. We were prepared to make all possible efforts in order to come to an understanding with the Arabs, but this did not mean that failing an understanding we would stop our work. Immigration into Palestine was to us an absolute right. It did not depend on the consent of the Arabs. It would have been a great thing for us to be able to get their agreement, but if that was impossible, our immigration must continue without it." 37. In June information appeared to have reached Government to the effect that certain Jewish circles were favouring the idea of * The conversation took place in the morning after the outrageous murder of Dr. L. Billig, the lecturer of Arabic in the Hebrew University.